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Abstract 
Evergreening is the strategic extension of the duration of a temporary monopolistic or 
market dominant position by means of IP strategies, and in practice patent strategies 
particularly. This paper explores the evergreening phenomenon. After an introductory 
description of evergreening and its associated innovation and IP policy issues, the paper 
provides a literature review. We further present one case of the pharmaceutical blockbuster 
drug Losec (Omeprazol) that became the world’s best selling drug from 1996 to 2000. The 
case is accompanied by short evergreeing examples based on other IPRs such as trade 
marks. A theoretical part discusses different types of evergreening approaches along with 
simple models. The paper ends with a discussion of implications for managerial counter-
strategies and innovation and IP policies. 
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1 Problem background 
The tragic 9/11 events in 2001 implied a delay in the court proceedings in Boston that dealt 
with a case involving AstraZeneca and its blockbuster drug Losec (Prilosec in the US, with 
generic name omeprazol, with its key basic patent received by the Swedish company Astra 
in the US in 1981 (US patent # 4.255.431, issued March 10, 1981), later merged with 
Zeneca in 1998-9. This delay implied in turn that competitive entry into the Losec market 
was delayed. 
At this time media circulated an undemented estimate of 200 MUSD as the monthly profits 
reaped by AZ from this drug, profits that were to be heavily reduced by competitive entry 
which was sure to take place asap as the key patent expired as generic drug manufacturers 
had prepared their ”springboards” for entry into this lucrative market. 
Right or wrong, the sales, profits and profit margin of a blockbuster drug towards the end 
of its effective patent protection usually is very large, which incentivizes pharma firms to 
employ a myriad of means /tactics/strategiesto delay entries by competitors, ie means to 
maintain a competitive position and sustain any temporary competitive advantages, such as 
patent protection. In the case of AZ and its pre-merger constituent Astra, the expiration of 
this key patent, i e the ”patent cliff ”, together with Astra’s anticipated overdependence 
upon Losec had early on been perceived in Astra to have such dramatic consequences on 
its financial performance that it became an argument in favor of Astra’s merger with 
Zeneca in 1998-9. Astra had then since the 1980s tried to generate more radical 
innovations in its R&D pipeline but essentially without enough successes to be perceived 
as providing a business portfolio sufficiently diversified to pick up the company’s expected 
financial drop from the patent cliff, perceived by some as suicidal while disputed by others. 
Thus all in all, extending the effective patent protection of Losec and its successor Nexium 
in a second product generation, ie what is referred to as evergreening, bridging the patent 
cliff had become a strategic issue for AZ with powerful incentives to invent various 
strategies to that effect. 
AZ is not a unique case in this respect and many firms engage in various forms of 
evergreening. This is troublesome for competitors, not the least manufacturers of generic 
drugs in the pharmaceutical industry, who try to invent counterstrategies. Evergreening is 
also particularly troublesome at IP policy level since the statutory duration of IPRs, being a 
key policy variable for fostering dynamic competition, is in effect circumvented or 
invented around strategically by IPR users. 
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2 Aims and outline of this paper 
2.1 Aims 
Evergreening in a general sense refers to the extension of the duration of an existing 
temporary monopolistic or market dominant position by various means or strategies. We 
can then talk more specifically about evergreening of sales or profits from products, 
technologies, services and equity. Evergreening can then be accomplished by erecting 
entry barriers of all sorts or delaying entries or weakening competition and/or 
strengthening own competitive advantages when the dominant position is threatened. 
Typically evergreening has been practiced in pharmaceutucal industry when an IP-based 
temporary monopoly is about to expire, and then IP strategies for evergreening of IP as 
well as other means have been used to evergreen product sales. 
This paper aims to explore the phenomenon of evergreening by means of IP strategies in 
general, and patent strategies in particular. If, e.g. , an innovation which through wide-
spread adoption and diffusion has led to a high growth rate in a market with a low rate of 
technological substitutions and with a steep learning curve, then any prolongation of a 
dominant market position pays off handsomely. Traditionally evergreening involves 
follow-up patenting of product and process improvements and new and non-obvious 
applications or medical indications of the basic invention. Evergreening could also be 
accomplished by launching a series of product generations with overlapping technology or 
resource bases, where a strong patent position in the technological overlap is leveraged to a 
strong market position for the subsequent product generation. 
Evergreening is well recognized in industry, especially in the pharmaceutical industry, and 
in some policy circles, but it is not well researched by academia. Firms are clearly 
incentivized to engage in evergreening, and the patent system is also designed to encourage 
dynamic competition and the provision of innovations by granting innovators legal means 
for achieving a temporary or time limited monopolistic position sufficient to recover their 
investments in return for disclosure of their trade secrets. However, such an institutional 
design carries the seeds to counter its purpose when the time limits are not set right or 
could be strategically surpassed by its users, incentivizing them to become abusers. Policy 
responses are then called for, but as the paper will show such a call and response is 
difficult to get in tune. 
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2.2 Outline 
The paper provides a review of the scholarly literature on evergreening and its 
conceptualizations. As operationalizations of evergreening are by and large missing the 
paper will also provide some tentative ones for further empirical research, which is clearly 
and dearly needed.  
The paper then presents one empirical case of the pharmaceutical blockbuster drug Losec 
or Prilosec (with the generic name Omeprazol) launched with its first year of sales in 1988. 
Losec became the world’s best selling drug from 1996-2000 towards the end of the term of 
its strategic patent. The case also covers its second generation follow up drug Nexium, 
both developed and sold by the Swedish company Astra, later merged into Astra-Zeneca 
(partly because of fear for the Losec patent cliff). We provide evidence on the case and 
report insights based on extensive interviews with numerous key informants involved in 
the development process and subsequently following litigation activities. This case is 
particular rich in many aspects of evergreening based on an ever extended portfolio of 
IPRs, patents and follow up patenting in particular, but also trademarks and trade dress, 
within and across two product generations, and finally a successful global patent litigation 
strategy. The case moreover illustrates how a couple of IP policy developments 
substantially aided evergreening. The case in addition contains some unexpected drama, 
which is useful in getting attention to the evergreening phenomenon.  
The Losec case is accompanied by short examples of evergreening based on other IPRs 
such as trade secrets, trade marks, copyright, and database rights. The main case and the 
examples in the empirical part of the paper altogether illustrate different types of 
evergreening being based on different types of IPRs and IP strategies as well as on 
combinations of different types of IPRs into multi-protection strategies used within (intra-
generational) and across product generations (inter-generational). 
Some of the examples of evergreening are accompanied by some simple theoretical models 
in an appendix, provided in order to somewhat formally illustrate different types of 
complementary and substitute intellectual assets corresponding to some of the empirically 
identified evergreening strategies.  
The paper ends with a discussion of implications of evergreening strategies for managerial 
counter-strategies as well as for innovation and IP policies in an innovation system context. 
Showing the feasibility and profitability of various proven and perhaps as yet unproven 
evergreening strategies then serves the purpose to direct managerial efforts to counter-
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strategies and policy efforts to counter-policies in order to improve the innovation system 
on the whole to the extent that evergreening constitutes problems for dynamic competition, 
which it likely does. A number of policy issues are raised and a few policy options are 
analyzed in more detail in the paper. However, problems related to evergreening are not 
easily fixed by policy measures, given the inherent problems to finetune the patent system 
in light of the changing nature of technological change, changing modes of innovation and 
increasing risk of political capture. Given the meagre state of art regarding evergreening 
much of this endeavor must be left for experimentation and further research in the hope of 
evergreening research on evergreening. 
In summary, this paper aims at making six types of contributions: A review of small but 
steadily growing academic literature on evergreening by IP strategies, a discourse of 
evergreening for each of the various IPR types, a case study particularly rich in various 
strategies for evergreening, a conceptual review with a proposed definition, typology and 
operationalization of evergreening by IP strategies, some simple formal modelling and a 
discussion of the strategy-policy game or dilemma. 
 
3 Conceptual review 
3.1 Defining evergreening 
In our literature review we found six definitions or definition-like descriptions of 
evergreening. The most recent definition was provided by Alkhafaji, Trinquart et al. 
(2012), defining evergreening as a way that allows “owners of pharmaceutical products 
using numerous strategies, such as patent laws and minor drug modifications, to extend 
their monopoly privileges with their products”. Rathod (2010) defines evergreening as a 
“strategy by which technology producers, using serial secondary patents and other 
mechanisms, keep their product sales protected for longer periods of time than would 
normally be permissible under the law”. According to Bansal, Sahu et al. (2009), 
evergreening “refers to different ways wherein patent owners take undue advantage of the 
law and associated regulatory processes to extend their IP monopoly particularly over 
highly lucrative ‘blockbuster’ drugs by filing disguised/artful patents on an already patent-
protected invention shortly before expiry of the ‘parent’ patent.” Thomas (2009) defines 
evergreening as “strategy of obtaining multiple patents that cover different aspects of the 
same product, typically by obtaining patents on improved versions of existing products.” In 
a multinational study of causes and consequences of a low inventive step requirement for 
patenting Granstrand (2003: 247)) describes evergreening as a strategy by which “effective 
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are not necessarily set right in the first place, especially since they are interdependent and 
companies in different industries use different mixes of multiple IPRs and IPR types in 
form of multiprotection strategies for their businesses. Consequently we do not want to 
confine evergreening neither to patents alone nor to the pharmaceutical industry alone in 
order to keep focus on the more generic policy issue of assessing the proper (optimal) 
duration of IPR protection in light of the strategic gaming of the IPR system by companies, 
which possibly could lead to losses of not only static efficiency but also losses in dynamic 
efficiency, thereby making the IPR system counteract its basic purpose. On the other hand 
we do not want a too broad a definition of evergreening that would confuse and cloud this 
policy issue with other ones such as abuse of market power and market leveraging in 
general and protection of product sales and profits through delayed entries and competition 
from other practices unrelated to IPRs as referred to in the EU description above. This 
means that e.g. reverse settlements will fall outside our preferred definition of IP-based 
evergreening or evergreening of IP protection but inside a more general concept of 
evergreening of product sales. Thus we propose the following (tentative) definition of IP 
based evergreening: 
 
IP based evergreening is the business strategy to extend the duration of the effective 
protection derived or derivable from a portfolio of IPRs in order to increase the 
appropriability of an innovation or a set of business related innovations or 
technologies. 
 
Some commentary to this definition is called for. First evergreening is a business strategy 
but not confined to a strategy employed only in an individual company, but the strategy 
could also be employed e.g. in a corporate innovation system or in open innovation with 
several collaborating organizations. Second, evergreening is not confined to companies and 
purely commercial entities but could possibly be used in a business environment by 
universities, R&D institutes, NGOs and non-profit or not-for profit organizations as long as 
they are concerned about appropriability of an innovation or a technology, e.g. in terms of 
capturing societal value rather than commercial value, e.g. by limiting the latter. Third, 
evergreening is tied to using a portfolio of IPRs as a means for increasing appropriability, 
thereby excluding the use of non-IPR means for the same purpose. Alternatively one could 
broaden the concept of evergreening and then distinguish between IPR based and non-IPR 
based evergreening. Fourth, the relevant IPRs for evergreening could be of any type, not 
© Ove Granstrand, Frank Tietze (2014)  IP strategies and policies for and against evergreening  
8 
 
only patent rights, and they are not confined to ownership rights only but they also include 
usage rights or licensing rights. Fifth, the definition is chosen so the concept of 
evergreening can be operationalized and measured, at least in principle. This will be 
returned to later.. 
 
4 Literature review 
Our literature review identifies 33 publications, with the oldest one being from 2001 (see 
Figure 2). They include 21 peer reviewed academic papers, seven kind of academic style 
working papers or unpublished manuscripts (including one white paper of the US 
Congressional Research Service), two reports (each one by the European Commission and 
the US Federal Trade Commission), one book chapter, one PhD thesis and a few short 
magazine-like articles or published only online.  
 
Figure 2 - Annual and cumulated evergreening publications; Source: Own research 
Among the papers, one appeared in NATURE Biotechnology (Gaudry 2011) and one was 
published in Science (Higgins and Graham 2009), indicating a certain level of relevance 
for the topic. By far the top cited paper is Lemley and Moore (2003) with a total of 266 
citations, hence an average of 27 annual citations since its publication, followed by 
Hemphill & Sampat (2012) with 20 annual citations and the EU report (European 
Commission 2008) with 18 annual citations. All other papers have less than 10 annual 
citations. 
Very few papers appeared in business related journals. Rathod (2010) was published in a 
journal of business professionals in the generic medicine sector, Kesselheim (2007) 
published in a journal that is edited by the American Association of Pharmaceutical 
Scientists (AAPS) that also aims at business professionals, and Parker and Carruth (2007) 
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was published in the Journal of Commercial Biotechnology. Rather, papers were published 
in general law journals such as Darrow (2010) published in Harvard Law Review, 
Chalmers (2006) published in Melbourne University Law Review, Lemley & Moore 
(2003) published in the Boston University Law Review, Paine (2003) in Seton Hall Law 
Review, and Parchomovsky and Siegelman (2002) in Virginia Law Review. Three papers 
were published in dedicated medical journals, such as Alkhafaji, Trinquart et al. (2012) 
published in BMC Medicine, Gaudry (2011) published in Nature Biotechnology (being a 
lawyer) and Hollis (2004) in the Journal of Pharmacy & Pharmaceutical Sciences. Two 
articles appeared in health related economic journals, such as Hemphill & Sampat (2012) 
published in the Journal of Health Economics, and Faunce and Lexchin (2007) in the 
Australia and New Zealand Health Policy. The paper by Faunce, Vines et al. (2008) 
appeared in the Journal of Law and Medicine, a cross-disciplinary journal publishing 
contributions related to legal, medical or bioethical content arising at the intersection of 
law and health. Apparently, not any of the published papers appeared in a mainstream, peer 
reviewed management journal or even a journal associated with technology and innovation 
management. One recent working paper was however published by colleagues at INSEAD 
with a managerial focus on IP (Jain and Conley 2012). 
Most articles are concerned with the topic on national policy level / legislation, for instance 
addressing questions of whether evergreening has a negative impact on costs for the health 
insurance system of a specific country e.g. , (Alkhafaji, Trinquart et al. 2012). Chalmers 
(2006) discusses evergreening in the context of the Australia-United States Free Trade 
Agreement. Authors of other papers are concerned with how legislation impacts firm’s 
evergreening behavior. Other papers focus on the impact of international regulatory treaties 
such as TRIPS on the functioning of a patent systems and the pharmaceutical companies 
within a specific country, e.g. , in India (Amin 2007, Nair 2008). Other papers are 
concerned with how generic manufacturer enter the market of patented drugs.  
Some papers take the perspective of society and the generic producer arguing against 
evergreening strategies. In contrast, Higgins and Graham (2009) argue in SCIENCE not in 
favor or evergreening, but rather against too much possibilities to enter the market despite 
patent protection through generic producers. The authors report cases where due to chapter 
IV exemptions firms were allowed to bring generic drugs on the market, even before the 
original inventor has recouped its R&D spendings, hence this raising societies awareness 
for the incentives for an innovative pharmaceutical system. The analysis of Gaudry (2011) 
presented in NATURE Biotechnology is one of the few empirically support study and 
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argues in a similar line. The author concludes that “current R&D efforts are in part 
supported by the additional exclusivities offered by this approach”, meaning the additional 
possibilities of exclusivity periods in combination of patenting, even showing that the 
efforts seemed to have declined along the studied decade (2000-2010). 
Most papers focus on the north-American situation. Seven papers focus specifically on the 
US (Federal Trade Commission 2002, Lemley and Moore , Paine 2003, Kesselheim 2007, 
Thomas 2009, Darrow 2010, Hemphill and Sampat). Two papers focus on Canada 
(Grootendorst 2009, Crowley and Lybecker 2012). Addressing the Asian situation, we only 
found five papers addressing particularly the situation in India (Amin 2007, Nair 2008, 
Bansal, Sahu et al. 2009, Kumar, Shukla et al. 2009, Nair 2009). When it comes to the 
European situation we found two papers that focus on the UK (Burdon and Sloper 2003, 
Parker and Carruth 2007), one paper that uses data from France (Alkhafaji et al., 2012) and 
one report by the European Commission addressing the consolidated EU situation 
(European Commission, 2008).  
Several papers discuss evergreening across two or more countries. The paper by Rathod 
(2010) has a specific focus on the comparison of evergreening practices across different 
countries covering Canada, Australia, India, Philippines, and Thailand. Crowley and 
Lybecker (2012) compare the situation in Canada, US, EU, South Korea, Japan, Australia, 
and Brazil. Faunce and Lexchin (2007) compare evergreening in Canada with the 
Australian situation. Hollis (2004) compares drug prices in Canada and the US. A brief 
comparison of exclusivity regimes of the EU, Canada, Japan, and the US is also included 
in Higgins & Graham (2009). Mueller and Chisum (2008) compare the situation in the US 
and UK.  
Some papers, particularly those that do not deal with specific national legislation but rather 
focus on managerial or theoretical aspects do not have a specific country focus, such as 
Jain and Conley (2012), and Parchomovsky and Siegelman (2002). 
The literature review identified five papers in which either one specific or multiple 
evergreening strategies are discussed (Lemley and Moore 2003, Paine 2003, Raasch 2006, 
Rathod 2010, Jain and Conley 2012). The typology suggested by Raasch (2006) appears to 
be the most comprehensive one covering relatively well the different evergreening 
strategies that were discussed by other authors. Also, the typology is probably most helpful 
for managers as being designed to be used on firm level. Additionally, the strategies briefly 
discussed by Granstrand (1999) and Granstrand (2003) are also valuable for firm level IP 
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management. However, the state of the art in the academic literature must still be seen as 
meagre in terms of lacking systematic empirical studies. 
Additionally, two publications should be mentioned. First, the report by the Federal Trade 
Commission (2002) should be mentioned that focuses particularly on the Hatch-Waxman 
Act and it implications for firms’ evergreening behavior. The Hatch-Waxman should 
balance incentives for continued innovation by research-based pharmaceutical companies 
and opportunities for market entry by generic drug manufacturers. Several amendments 
have been made to the act to facilitate generic drug entry. The share of generic drugs on the 
US market increased from 19 percent in 1984 to 47 percent in 2001. The study examines 
whether the conduct that the FTC challenged represented isolated instances or is more 
typical, and particularly whether the 180-day exclusivity and the 30-month stay provisions 
of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments are susceptible to strategies to delay or deter consumer 
access to generic alternatives to brand-name drug products. The study concludes deriving 
two major and a few minor recommendations for additional amendments.  
 
Table 1: Evergreening cases covered in prior literature 
Authors (year) Case studies 
Jain and Conley (2012) AstraZeneca (Prilosec2 and Nexium)3 and Eli Lilly (Prozac and 
Zyprexa) 
Dwivedi, Hallihosur et 
al. (2010) 
Bristol-Myers Squibb and Taxolc; Pfizer and Viagra; 
AstraZeneca and Prilosec/ Omeprazole 
Faunce, Vines et al. 
(2008) 
Apotex vs. Servier; Alphapharm vs. Lundbeck 
Raasch (2006) Eli Lilly, Pfizer, Merck, and Schering-Plough 
Parchomovsky and 
Siegelman (2002) 
Roundup, Nutrasweet, Tagamet, Zovirax, Bayer Aspirin 
Paine (2003) Several firm and drug examples 
 
Second, the paper by Conley and Szobocsan (2001) should be mentioned, who discuss the 
complementarity of different IPRs and characterized the proactive management of multiple 
IP regimes across the life cycle of an offering in a manner that sustained the value of the 
initial innovation as value transference. However, their discussion remains to be 
superficial. Furthermore, Parchomovsky and Siegelman (2002) focus on “leveraging 
                                                 
2 Also mentioned in Federal Trade Commission (2002). Generic drug entry prior to patent expiration: An FTC study, 
Federal Trade Commission.. 
3 Also briefly mentioned in other papers, such as Rathod, S. K. (2010). "Ever-greening: A status check in selected 
countries." Journal of Generic Medicines 7(3): 227-242.. 
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patents though trademarks” and to some limited extent discuss how also trade secrets and 
copyrights can be used as complements to prolong market exclusivity. They identified two 
main benefits for a firm: the exclusivity secured by the patent might lower the marketing 
costs of creating a strong brand and simplify the establishment of brand loyalty by locking 
out competition. 
All papers with an industry focus or that provide case studies draw on the pharmaceutical 
industry and then almost solely on patent strategies. None of the papers we identified 
draws specifically on another industry or on other IPRs. Several papers include case 
studies to illustrate and substantiate their arguments, respectively present evergreening 
strategies. Very little quantitative data is available about evergreening strategies and no 
operationilization of evergreening was found, nor any typology of IPR based evergreening 
per se4 Except some papers that use quantitative, primarily secondary empirical data, such 
as systematized patent statistics where the analyses remains descriptive. Notably papers 
include Alkhafaji, Trinquart et al. (2012), Hemphill and Sampat (2012), Gaudry (2011), 
European Commission (2008), and Lemley and Moore (2003). The data used by Hemphill 
and Sampat (2012) is probably the most extensive and solid quantitative study on 
evergreening. The report by the Federal Trade Commission (2002) should be mentioned 
additionally as it presents some limited descriptive data (e.g., on litigation cases, 
settlements, usage of later-issued patents). 
 
5 Methodology  
5.1 Literature review 
For the literature review we used keywords to search iteratively in Google Scholar and ISI 
Web of Knowledge to identify papers related to the concept of evergreening (Cronin, Ryan 
et al. 2008). Essentially besides “evergreening” we used three notions “extension of market 
exclusivity period”, “continuation patents” and “patent prosecution tactics”. These 
synonyms emerged gradually from reading papers that we were able to find. We however 
did not search for broad terms like “life cycle management” or “life cycle management 
plans”.  
Since we did not focus specifically on the pharmaceutical industry and drug development, 
we did not search specifically for papers related to the life cycle management of drugs, 
                                                 
4 Evergreening in the general sense has been operationalized as the time gap between patent expiration of a drug and the 
first entry of generics. This gap then depends also on the use of other strategies for evergreening such as reverse 
settlements (”pay-for-delay ” deals). 
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although it appeared that by far most of the papers we identified are related to the 
pharmaceutical business.5 
5.2 Case study 
The singly case study Losec is based on multiple, extensive semi-structured, open-ended 
interviews involving almost all key stakeholders that were deeply involved in developing 
Losec, such as the top management of Astra at that time and persons heading the litigation 
team against generic companies. The data collection spans multiple years from the early to 
the mid 2000s. Multiple key respondents thus ensure result validity (Jick 1979, Van 
Bruggen, Lilien et al. 2002, Homburg, Klarmann et al. 2012). Additionally, the available 
literature was reviewed (e.g. Östholm, Wood et al. 1995, Sundling 2003) and secondary 
data was provided by the interviewees as was collected through desk research via a web 
search (e.g. annual reports). 
 
6 Pharmaceutical case study of evergreening 
 
“Five times we were told we should terminate the project… That it survived despite all these set-backs is an 
exciting tale of dedication and the efforts of very capable scientists.” 6 
 
Back in 1956, the first idea was born to develop a drug that would neutralize hydrochloric 
acid in the stomach. After a symposium in 1966, a small group of researchers at Astra 
Hässle turned the acute need for the treatment of peptic ulcers into a research project at the 
small research subsidiary of Astra AB in Mölndal. The project turned out to be more 
challenging than ever could be expected. 
 
“Everyone spoke against the project. The substances we had chosen for tests were either toxic, had potential 
side effects, or had absolutely no effect on humans. We had no chemical structure from which to start our 
renewed effort. It was easy to find arguments to end the project.” 7 
 
 
                                                 
5 We acknowledge the support of Tobias Röth for his support in collection the papers.  
6  Östholm, I., et al. (1995). Drug discovery : a pharmacists story. Stockholm, Swedish Pharmaceutical Society 
(Apotekarsocieteten). 
7 Ibid, p.171 
© Ove Granstrand, Frank Tietze (2014)  IP strategies and policies for and against evergreening  
14 
 
 
Figure 3: Losec development chronology 
 
Driven by believe in the medical need of a small group of people, after more than twenty 
years the project resulted in approval of a drug called Losec, by the Swedish authorities 
(corresponding to the US FDA) for sales on the Swedish market in 1988. Estimates of total 
R&D costs for Losec range between 200 and 300 m$, i.e. depending on what costs are 
taken into account. In 1996, Losec became the world’s largest selling drug for four 
consecutive years.  
Figure 4: Accumulated worldwide patient treatments with Losec [mio] 
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6.1 Inventions and patents that led to Losec 
During the twenty years of research to develop Losec, several patents were filed by Astra, 
essentially on new substance-classes that were discovered. However, finally Losec was 
essentially protected by two patent families as illustrated by the patent-to-product map 
illustrated in Figure 2. One patent family covered the invention of the active substance 
(Omeprazole), while the other covered the formulation, i.e. the way the drug is packaged 
for controlled release. While the substance patent was filed in 1979, the formulation patent 
was filed as late as in 1987. The substance Omeprazole proved to be very difficult to 
handle as it does not tolerate light, heat or water and even worst, hydrochloride acid. Astra 
had to manage the transport of this unstable substance through the acid environment of the 
stomach in order to reach the duodenum where the substance is released and transported 
via the blood to the stomach’s acid producing cells. Once inside the cells, Omeprazole is 
transformed into an active proton pump inhibitor 8 . Astra managed this complicated 
‘transportation’ problem by inventing a double coating system and filed for patent 
protection for this invention as shown.  
 
 
Figure 5: Product-to-patent map of Losec 
 
6.2 Evergreening Losec 
After Losec (Omeprazol) for stomach ulcers was developed at Astra-Hässle in Mölndal, 
Sweden, and launched with its first year of sales in 1988, it quickly became a commercial 
success and for several years was the world's annually bestselling drug. The basic patent on 
the active substance (EP 0005129) was applied for in 1979 in Europe and the US, among 
other countries, and was granted in 1981 in the US - which meant that its validity in the US 
expired in 1999 (although subsequently prolonged for three years). The basic patent can be 
regarded as a very strong one with a substantial inventive step and strategie blocking effect 
in terms of restricting possibilities for inventing around. Losec represented a whole new 
biological mechanism based on proton pump inhibitors, and was thus a technologically 
                                                 
8 Compared to competing medications, Losec affects only the particular enzyme responsible for pumping H2 in the 
stomach, while competing medications function the way as they are named, H2 blockers. 
The active substance Omeprazol
Covered by: EP 0005129
Expired in 1999
Double coating formulation
Covered by: US 4786505
Expired in 2007
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radical innovation that also became economically very large since it attained huge growth 
and its value has been estimated to lie in the interval of 15-30 b$. 
 
Figure 6: Evergreening of Losec 
 
This innovation contributed more than any other of Astra's radical innovations to making 
Astra one of the 15 largest global pharmaceutical companies, from having been among the 
40 largest before Losec. In 1999, annual sales of Losec increased for one more year up to 
its climax of 6.3 b$. In 2004, AstraZeneca was the sixth largest such company and had 
sales of prescription drugs amounting to 21.4 b$, ranked after Merck and before Novartis. 
 
 
Figure 7: Evergreening of Losec by Nexium 
 
After its initial launch, R&D efforts continued to develop an improved form of 
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substance patent. An essential step in the commercialization of Losec was precisely the 
development of a well-functioning pharmaceutical preparation. Astra sought and thus 
received a patent on the preparation, which proved to be very valuable in preventing 
competition with generic companies. An extra month without generic competition was to 
be worth at least 100 million US dollars for Astra. If a patent, or a series of several such 
patents; delayed generic entry by, say, 8 years, which is not unrealistic in the case of 
Losec, it means roughly almost 10 b$ in (undiscounted) patent value.  
 
 
Figure 8: Litigation history of Losec patents 
 
The case of Losec thus illustrates how patents with both large and small inventive steps in 
combination contribute to enormous growth in value, although not without patent 
enforcement efforts (see Figure 8). The fundamental prerequisite for the improvement 
patent to yield great growth of sales, value and welfare, however, was a radical basic 
innovation.  
The case thus illustrates that a so-called "evergreening" strategies, with follow-up 
patenting of more incremental inventions following upon a large or generic one, can be 
extremely economically successful. The drug Nexium, a descendant of Losec (the second 
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scientific terms - modest progress and constant improvement work along a "growth path". 
These cases altogether demonstrate the important interplay and synergies between radical 
and incremental innovations. 
 
6.3 Summary of the Losec case of evergreening 
The Losec-Nexium case as illustrates at least five major strategy types for evergreening. 
First is the use of a technically minor improvenment in form of a reformulation and 
repackaging. Second the development of a successor product as a second product 
generation with an overlapping technology base. Third the combination of patent 
protection with multiple trade mark protection (of product name, color, etc) and other 
brand building efforts and then aggressive marketing of the successor product. Fourth the 
use of aggressive litigation to fend off or delay entries. Five, the use of reverse settlements. 
All the time various patents and other IPRs were registered in addition to trade secrets 
together with various other more minor means.9 
 
7 Cases of evergreening by IPR type 
The traditional and still dominant form of evergreening uses patents. However, although 
patent strategies were central to evergreening in the Losec-Nexium case other IPRs were 
important as well as were evergreening by other means than IPRs. As will be illustrated 
below all other types of IPRs lend themselves to different forms of evergreening, with the 
common feature that the duration of the temporary competitive advantage a single IPR 
provides by IPR laws and regulations at policy level is extended by various IP strategies 
using multiple IPRs of the same type (single type protection) or multiple IPRs of different 
types (multi-protection10).  
 
7.1 Patents 
As for patents, the most common form of evergreening uses patents on subsequent 
improvements or different features of the original innovation, mostly then a product 
innovation. These follow-on patents are often minor technically seen (but not necessarily 
                                                 
9 In fact, during the R&D phase of Losec in the Astra subsidiary Hässle outside Gothenburg kept a low profile since the 
reigning blockbuster in the area 
was Smith-Kline-Beckman’s Tagamet, the world’s best selling drug for several years at the time, a drug that was likely to 
be evergreened with strategies directed at the much smaller company Astra at the time. This issue was covered in a joint 
study with late Edwin Mansfield by one of the authors of leakage rates of new technologies. The Astra subsidiary also 
encountered resistance against the Losec project internally in Astra and thus kept a low profile for that reason to allow a o 
gerilla R&D.  
10 Multiprotection refers more generally to the synergistic use of multiple IPRs of different types, see Granstrand (1999, 
pp.247-251). 
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economically seen) and could be taken out almost continually in the business development 
process. A case in point is the use of continous improvement processes (”Kaizen”) in 
Japanese industry which could result in a trail of cumulative or differentiating patents not 
only for products but also for processes as companies drive down the learning curve. New 
applications, e.g. new medical applications, could also be discovered and patented. Thus 
complementary serial patents will be instrumental for evergreening. Also substitute patents 
are instrumental for evergreening in that they limit invent around possibilities for 
competitors. A case in point (out of many) is the DuPont attempt to protect its innovation 
nylon by a fence of substitute patents (an attempt that failed, however, see 
Granstrand1999). Thus continually building and maintaining a patent network with series 
of complementary strategic patent fences for different applications, processes and 
improvement trajectories would be an effective patent strategy for evergreening a product 
innovation.11 However other spatial patent configurations such as patent blankets could 
also be effective (although costly and perhaps not cost-effective) in blocking or delaying 
entries, not the least since they create entry deterring legal uncertainty. The important point 
for evergreening effectiveness is the temporal configuration, i e how the blocking or 
delaying patent portfolio is built up and maintained over time.  
This in turn presents several complex optimization problems for the prospective 
evergreener. One problem is simply the overall cost-effectiveness of evergreening. Another 
is how much to speed up R&D and patenting of complementary and substitute patents in 
the overall racing and waiting game with competitors, since waiting to apply for a 
subsequent serial patent increases the evergreening effect while the probability to lose out 
in the patent race with others increases (see Appendix for a simple model illustration. The 
optimization is moreover complicated by several factors and uncertainties. The essentiality 
of patents and patent fences is normally not known beforehand and neither is the validity 
of a patent when challenged for example. 
 
7.2 Trade secrets 
Products with long life cycles and technical imitation difficulties (e g due to high reverse 
engineering costs), like certain recipes in the food and drink industry, are likely to be 
protected by trade secrets. A trade secret can leak out or become non-unique by 
independent invention or simply be lost, e.g. by death or bit rot. Various secrecy strategies 
                                                 
11 A strategic patent fence is a patent fence (set of substitute patents) that altogether effectively blocks competing 
innovations. A single strategic (=essential) patent could then be seen as a reduced strategic patent fence.  
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are available. Leakage risks can e.g. be lowered by fragmentation of key knowledge into 
pieces and dispersing them across knowledge holders with limited access to each others’ 
knowledge. 12  
 This is essentially fragmentation of complementary resources in order to increase the 
duration of the entire trade secret, in other words a form of evergreening. Loss of 
knowledge can be countered by redundancy, which in turn increases leakage risks 
however. Redundency can then be seen as an aggregation of substitute resources. 
An example of the use of such strategies for evergreening is what we can call the 
Benedictine scheme, inspired by an unvalidated story about how the Benedictine monks 
protected their secret recipe for the Benedictine liqueur.13 The scheme (or evergreening 
strategy) was set up so only the abbot knew the whole secret, while two selected monks 
knew different halves of it. When the abbot died, one of the two monks was promoted to 
abbot and thereby was informed by the other monk while informing a new monk selected 
to replace him. This evergreening scheme then uses both knowledge fragmentation and 
knowledge redundancy but in a minimal way. 
 
7.3 Copyright 
The duration of copyright is very long but with a narrow scope, protecting only 
expressions and not ideas, as patents protect. Copyrighted products can have very long life 
cycles with substantial sales and are in general not particularly difficult to imitate and 
distribute technically (some paintings apart). The incentives to evergreen can thus be very 
strong despite the already long statutory duration but the narrow scope of protection limits 
the room for strategizing through portfolio extensions, instead incentivizing companies in 
the typical copyright industries to lobby for extensions of statutory duration of single 
copyrights. A case in point is the Disney protection of the Mickey Mouse character. 
Nevertheles there are possibilities to work with copyright portfolios for evergreening, e.g.  
by giving birth to new complementary or possibly also substitute characters over time in a 
family of cartoon or movie or game or ad characters, such as in Donald Duck. Derivative 
works with also play an important role for evergreening in the copyright area, comparable 
to but still different from patenting of product improvements. 
 
                                                 
12 This is then at the expense of lower knowledge productivity and creativity in an organization, see e g Granstrand 1999. 
13 See Granstrand 1999, pp.253-54. 
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7.4 Trademarks 
Trademark protection already allows for eternal evergreening since they do not expire by 
statutory law as long as they are properly maintained (and not diluted or degenerated). Still 
portfolios of complementary and even substitute trademarks could be built up and used for 
evergreening purposes, e.g. in form of dual marks such as Sony Walkman and Sony 
Discman where the product mark may lose its protective value over time but then has made 
a contribution to the company name which could be carried over to a subsequent product.14 
New forms of trademarks, protecting special colour combinations, sounds and 3D shapes, 
open up more possibilities of this sort. 
 
7.5 Designs 
Design rights are time limited as well. In many respects they are similar to ”small” patents 
or utility patents and could be used for evergreening in somewhat similar ways. Case in 
point is Apple’s series of smart phones in which certain icons and shapes are kept as well 
as added throughout different product generations. The lower inventive or creative step 
requirement actually facilitates evergreening at the same time as the risk of losing a patent 
race is lower since there are more possibilities to design around.15 The possibilities to fence 
off substitutes are then more limited on the other hand. 
 
7.6 Data base rights 
Data base rights as existing in Europe have a 15 year statutory duration by law but are 
open to evergreening in that they are limitlessly renewable as long as new investments are 
made in the database. This is in contrast to other IPRs.16  
 
7.7 License rights 
License rights are as usage rights different from ownership rights but can be used as a 
complement to the latter in evergreening. In the case of patents a grant-back license on all 
improvements made by licensees broadens the set of controllable improvements and 
lessens the risk of losing a technological lead. The same outcome may be achieved in case 
of licensing trade secrets in form of know-how licenses. A by now classic case is the 
sharing of production secrets in the VHS family of video cassette recorder producers held 
                                                 
14 This has been described in the literature as CI/BI building, commonly used in Japan originally, see Granstrand 1999. 
15 In the smart phone case the inventive step requirement for a design patent in the US was allegedly so low that it would 
not qualify even for copyright protection (Ralph Oman, personal communication). 
16 There is an investment related requirement in the maintenance of a trade secret right in that the rights holder has to 
make demonstrable efforts to protect the secret that moreover has to have commercial value so a pure investment is not 
sufficient. 
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together by JVC as licensor. A similar arrangement could be found in e.g. the copyright 
area where software developers and/or users feed back their improvements or applications 
to an original source code developer or a software community. Viral contracts or 
copylefting could then serve to extend the duration of a specific IP protection regime rather 
than the duration of IPR protection per se. Arrangements for user led innovation or 
producer led innovation similarly could be used for evergreening in a more general sense. 
 
7.8 Summary 
As seen all the different IPR types lend themselves to evergreening although with different 
strategies and different effectiveness. The strategies have some elements in common, 
however. IPR protection of fragmented complementary resources facilitates evergreening 
as does aggregation of substitute resources. Fragmentation is moreover facilitated by a low 
inventive or creative step requirement, which on the other hand facilitates invent or design 
around, in turn lessening the blocking or delaying of competition. 
Finally the various evergreening strategies for the different IPR types could with a few 
exceptions be combined into multiprotection, as illustrated in our case study of Losec. 
Thus they are by and large complementary, with a major exception being patent rights and 
secrecy rights which for the same scope of protection cannot be combined. However, at the 
level of an innovation they can, e.g. by combining a product patent with secrecy protection 
of the production process as is well known. (See Appendix for a simple but illustrative 
formalization.) 
 
8 Analysis and discussion  
8.1 Operationalizing evergreening 
The first step in operationalizing the phenomenon of evergreening is to typologize it in 
order to use nominal scales and perhaps also ordinal measurement scales. 
As seen from conceptual review, the literature review, and the case studies we can 
distinguish between the following types: 
 
• Evergreening of a dominant market position on the 
product/technology/service/equity market by IP/non-IP strategies where the 
dominant position in the first place may have been derived by IP/non-IP strategies. 
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• Evergreening by IP –strategies may in turn be based on single/multi -type IPRs for 
intra/inter-generational evergreening, using different types of IP-strategies (e g 
strategic /follow-on/ sequential patenting in form of fences, blankets etc. for 
products, processes and applications). 
 
The case of inter-generational evergreening with three product generations may be 
illustrated as in Figure 9 below.17 
The next step in operationalizing evergreening is to introduce some metrics. Here we will 
link a first kind of the metrics to the duration of an IPR portfolio in some time units. A 
second kind of metrics is linked to the time gap between the possible entry by competitors 
but for evergreening and the actual entries by competitors. If IP based evergreening is 
effective in delaying entry, then the first kind of metrics provide a lower bound on 
evergreening and the latter an upper bound. Needless to say the necessary counterfactual 
analysis for the latter kind of metrics involves uncertainty and subjective assessments, as 
does in fact the first kind as well. 
 
                                                 
17 A good case of intergenerational evergreening is the Gillette sequence of razors with 1-2-3-4-5 razor blades, and each 
generation covered by numerous patents of which some read on more then one generation. The use of backward and 
forward compatibility of razors and razor blades and standards further contributes to evergreening. 
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to the approaches in systems reliability theory used to determine the expected life time of a 
functioning technical system.  
The second approach proposed here is related to financial theory and takes the economic 
values explicitly into account (but still yields a measure of duration in time units). The 
portfolio of IPRs is then looked upon as a portfolio of (indivisible, intellectual) assets, each 
with a revenue stream associated with it (although more difficult to assess than for bonds 
or other securities). The different duration measures for financial asset portfolios could 
then be generalized to apply to IPR portfolios, which in contrast to “normal” financial asset 
portfolios have random revenue streams in continuous time (see Appendix 1). 
Finally, once the duration of an IPR portfolio is operationalized in form of a one-
dimensional measure in time units then the difference in duration resulting from additional 
IPRs added to the portfolio could be calculated and taken as a measure of the extent of 
evergreening in time units. 
 
8.2 The strategy-policy game 
Many of the problems with the patent system derive from the fact that the system can be 
strategically gamed by its users in ways that are difficult to counter by policy makers, 
including law makers. This leads to a meta-game between strategists at industry level, who 
are involved in a competitive game with each other, and policy makers at the government 
level, who needless to say might be involved in games with each other as well. We will 
refer to this meta-game as the strategy-policy game.18 
This kind of meta-game is more or less omnipresent in any decentralized governance 
system and it should come as no surprise that it is present in the patent system in general. 
Evergreening by exploiting the rules in the patent system then provides a good illustration 
of the strategy-policy game as strategists want to increase the duration of effective patent 
protection in order to increase monopolistic rents while policy makers want to limit it in 
order to increase competition. At the same time viewing evergreening as a strategy –policy 
game provides useful analytical tools for coping with evergreening. One such tool is a 
strategy-policy matrix as shown in Table 1, considering the three categories policy-makers 
(without a competing category), evergreeners and their competitors. 
As seen from table 1 there are many elaborate strategy options for evergreening and a fair 
amount of response strategies, while the standard patent policy variables are relatively few, 
i e duration, inventive step (non-obviousness), scope of protection, patentable subject 
                                                 
18 This type of game can be looked upon as being played in simple cases at two levels with two competing categories of 
collaborating players at each level- a rule-making level and a subordinate rule-playing level. 
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matter and patenting fees. It is outside the scope of this exploratory paper to make an 
economic policy analysis of evergreening and suggest policies to cope with it, but a few 
observations and reflections are in order. First it is a daunting task to assess the economic 
consequences of evergreening that operates in increasingly complex technologies with 
significant prospects as well as costs for improvements with unclear counterfactuals. 
Evergreening defendants may argue somewhat in line with Kitch’s prospect theory and the 
standard critique of that theory is difficult to empirically verify.Nevertheless evergreening 
is widespread and probably increasingly so and it runs counter to the basic idea of limiting 
the duration of IPRs, patents in particular. This clearly calls for policy analysis and 
research, which in turn requires clear definitions, operationalizations and typologies, to 
which end this paper hopefully has made some contributions. Second, even if evergreening 
is found to be detrimental to innovativeness, growth and welfare, at least certain types of it, 
it is difficult to find effective policy remedies that can add to the countering effects of 
strategies against it, i e add to the market forces.19 This is so much due to the compounded 
effects of changes in terms of the parameters or policy variables in the patent system with 
its one-size-fits-all features and the industry specific nature of evergreening. More 
restrictions on the use of patent term restorations upon application are possible. 
Raising the inventive step requirement is also possible but with mixed effects upon 
evergreening since possibilities to patent minor sequential improvements are reduced but 
so are invent around possibilities. 20 Third, policy remedies are perhaps more called for and 
also more easy to find for some other forms of evergreening, not being based on patents, as 
practiced in the pharmaceutical industry (including Astra Zeneca in the Nexium case), 
reverse settlements and branding post-patent drugs. The latter form of evergreening is 
based on IPRs, trade marks in particular, and could be surprisingly effective and profitable, 
not the least in countries as China with generics of poor quality, a fair amount of 
corruption, weak government price controls and a foreign-is-better syndrome among 
buyers, prescribers and users, promoted by various means by foreign producers. 
 
 
                                                 
19 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in the US has voiced concerns, emanating in a legal brief in a special case in 
2012, that reformulations of a pharmaceutical, dubbed a ”product hopping” strategy by the FTC, in effect can be 
detrimental to competition by helping to keep generics out of the market rather than providing useful medical innovations 
(The Economist, June 21st 2014, p.72). 
20 Raising the inventive step requirement could be justified on other grounds such as the need to reduce transaction costs, 
see Granstrand 2003, Ch 10 for an empirical and theoretical study with this conclusion. 
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Table 4. The strategy-policy matrix for patent based evergreening21 
Evergreening policies 
For22 Against23 
• Patent term restoration 
• Injunctions 
• Delaying licenses, concessions, approvals, 
litigation etc. 
 
• Reduction of statutory duration 
• Reducing the scope of protection 
• Reducing patentable subject matter 
• Increasing the inventive step requirement 
• Increasing patenting fees for sequential and/or 
substitute patents 
• Market power abuse intervention 
• Compulsory licensing 
• Abandoning the patent system 
  
Evergreening strategies 
For                   Against24 
• Search and research for strategic patents and 
patent fences 
• Fragmentation and patenting of complementary 
resources and elements in the business 
innovation system, typically by 
• follow-on/ continous sequential patenting of 
product/process improvements, features and 
applications for the innovation and its related 
complements 
• Aggregation and patenting of substitute 
resources and products/ technologies, typically 
by blocking patents and patent fencing outside 
the own product area (cf ”offensive 
patenting”25) 
• Sequential patent blanketing and patent 
flooding 
• Multiprotection, combining patents with other 
IPRs 
• Grant-back licensing 
• Deterring litigation and litigation threats, 
possibly using NPEs and privateering26 
• Lobbying 
• Invalidation27 
• Invent around 
• Patent or license acquisition  
• Patent pooling and cross-licensing 
• Partnering 
• Use of general bargaining power, e.g. 
purchasing or procurement power 
• Ignore and/or infringe 
• Delay entry until patent expiration 
• Abandon entry and related commercial 
operations and R&D  
Patent racing to foreclose evergreening patents, 
e.g. by surrounding a strategic patent with 
application patents or invent around or racing 
for strategic improvement patents. 
 
                                                 
21 The table gives important and common examples of patent-based evergreening but is not exhaustive. Non-patent based 
means for evergreening of product sales also exist such as marketing of branded products after patent protection has 
expired (”off-patent” products) and reverse settlements (”pay-for-delay” of entry). 
Moreover, policies as well as strategies for and against evergreening could be regarded as opposites and included in the 
matrix as such. Similarly policies aimed at strengthening or weakening the propensity to employ a certain strategy could 
be included. Such examples that are easy to derive logically are excluded here, however. 
22 Policies are taken in a broad sense here and includes laws, regulations, agency decisions and interventions. Policies in a 
narrow sense explicitly designed to promote evergreening in general are fairly rare in practice as to be expected. In theory 
they are conceivable, however, e g in line with the arguments in Kitch’s prospect theory, claiming that a broad and 
durable protective scope in emerging technologies allows for more coordinated subsequent improvement processes by the 
rights holder. 
 
24 Response strategies to blocking patents in general apply here, see Granstrand 1999, pp.232-234 in addition to patent 
strategies to foreclose evergreening patents. 
25 The dichotomy defensive/offensive patenting is avoided here since it is both unclear and value-laden. 
26 See especially Ewing (2011) on privateering. The use of privateering specifically for evergreening is likely although 
unclear, however. 
27 Invalidation of patents, especially by digging up prior art, is more common than generally recognized and could 
possibly affect a major share of all patents, see in particular Henkel et al. (2014). 
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9 Summary and conclusions 
Evergreening is a strategy practiced since long in industry, particularly in the 
pharmaceutical and chemical industry, for extending a dominant market position, typically 
derived from and based on IPRs,typically patents. The academic literature and research on 
evergreening has lagged behind this practice with a small but steadily growing literature 
since the early 2000s, mostly case studies with almost no quantitative studies and almost 
exclusively dealing with the use of patents for evergreening in the pharmaceutical industry, 
fending off generics, and often then from advanced developing countries. A handful of 
definitions and descriptions have been forwarded but no operationalizations of 
evergreening. 
In summary, this paper aims at making a number of contributions: First the small but 
steadily growing academic literature on evergreening by IP strategies is reviewed. Second 
a case study of the pharmaceutical Losec and its successor drug Nexium is provided in 
some detail. This case is particularly rich in various strategies for evergreening and 
illustrates at least five major strategy types for evergreening. 
First is the use of a technically minor improvenment in form of a reformulation and 
repackaging. Second the development of a successor product as a second product 
generation with an overlapping technology base. Third the combination of patent 
protection with multiple trade mark protection (of product name, color, etc) and other 
brand building efforts and then aggressive marketing of the successor product. Fourth the 
use of aggressive litigation to fend off or delay entries. Five, the use of reverse settlements. 
All the time various patents and other IPRs were registered in addition to trade secrets 
together with various other more minor means. A third contribution is a discourse of 
evergreening for each of the various IPR types, followed by a conceptual review with a 
proposed definition, typology and operationalization of evergreening by IP strategies, 
accompanied by some appended simple formal modelling. Finally, the strategy-policy 
game or dilemma with strategies and policies for and against evergreening is discussed. At 
this stage of research on evergreening few strong conclusions can be forwarded except a 
standard one that more research is needed in the spirit of evergreening research on 
evergreening. 
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Appendix 1. Operationalization of evergreening 
As mentioned above, we use two approaches for operationalizing evergreening in terms of 
an increase in the duration of protection of the relevant IPR portfolio due to the addition of 
further IPR portfolios to it. Essentially evergreening then extends the expected market lead 
time for the innovator. 
If additional IPR portfolios are added repeatedly over time in such a way that the expected 
duration of the cumulated portfolios has no upper bound, then we could say that perfect 
evergreening has been achieved in theory. This concept could be formally stated but is 
omitted here. 
Approach I 
Given a portfolio M of intellectual resources or assets (e.g. technologies), protected by m 
IPRs with deterministic or random life expiration times L1,...,Lm, ordered in some way, the 
pure time duration dur(M), unweighted by any associated revenues, of the portfolio is a 
mapping of the joint probability distribution of L = (L1,…,Lm) to a one-dimensional 
random variable in time units such that it reflects the legitimate access time for competitors 
to the commercial user of the resources (cf market lead time), accounting for the structure 
of them in terms of being complementary and substitute resources (assets). See Appendix 2 
for some examples of such a mapping. 
 
Approach II 
Given a portfolio of m IPRs with a random revenue stream R1,…,Rn at deterministic or 
random times t1,…,tn, a value weighted duration durw(M) accounts for the value or revenue 
consequences of the expiration of the IPRs in the portfolio in a manner that allows for 
competitors to enter the relevant market. The value weighting procedure is similar to 
duration concepts for general asset portfolios in finance. The one suggested here 
corresponds to the Fisher-Weil type for fixed securities, which is defined as: 
 
݀ݑݎݓ(ܯ) =  ෍ ݐ௜ ܴ௜ ݁ି௥೔௧೔
௡
௜ୀଵ
෍ ܴ௜ ݁ି௥೔௧೔
௡
௜ୀଵ
൘   
 
where ri is the discount rate at time ti. 
 
We extend this definition to continuous time with instantaneous revenues R(t) occurring 
continuously over time t with a piece-wise constant or continuously varying discount rate 
r(t): 
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݀ݑݎݓ(ܯ) =  න ݐܴ(ݐ)݁ି௥(௧)௧݀ݐ 
ஶ
଴
න ܴ(ݐ)݁ି௥(௧)௧݀ݐ
ஶ
଴
൙  
 
 
Evergreening 
The evergreening effect evg(M, ΔM) of adding a portfolio ΔM of further IPRs to the 
existing portfolio could then be operationalized as: 
 
evg(M, ∆M) = dur(M ∪ ∆M) − dur(M) 
 
where durw could also be used. Note that the duration and evergreening effect in general 
are random variables, and if ΔM is added later in time, evg could turn negative.  
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Appendix 2. Some simple models of IP portfolio duration and evergreening of IP. 
If m patents are essential with life expiration times ܮ௜ , then the duration of the 
corresponding portfolio could be defined as the time L it takes until all patents have 
expired and competitors have legitimate access in principle to all necessary or essential 
technologies. Then L = maxܮ௜ with probability distribution function F(x) = ∏ ܨ௜(ݔ)௠௜  if all 
life times are independent. The life expiration times Li could be seen as random in case the 
corresponding patent is possibly invalidated or unmaintained. In case a patent i applied for 
at time Ti is granted, maintained and valid for a fixed time of 20 years, its life expiration 
time probability distribution function is simply a condition function: 
 
ܨ௜(ݐ) = ߯(ݐ ≥ ௜ܶ + 20) 
 
If the m patents are perfect substitutes the duration L of the corresponding portfolio could 
be defined as the time it takes until any one patent expires, which is then the technology 
access time for competitors. Then L =minܮ௜ with probability distribution function 
  
G(x) = 1- ∏ ܩ௜௠௜ (ݔ) if all life times are independent, where ܩ௜ = 1 − ܨ௜. 
 
Patent portfolios with essential and substitute patents mixed could in principle be broken 
up in essential and substitute patent modules, which in turn could be treated in similar 
ways for calculating the duration of the entire portfolio, reflecting the technology access 
time for competitors, in turn influencing the imitation time for competitors and in turn the 
market lead time and the revenue stream for the innovator. This could be done for other 
IPRs as well, since duration is defined for IPRs in general. An example is the Benedictine 
case of evergreening the protection of a trade secret as described in the text. 
 
The Benedictine case 
Denote by L1 the random life expiration time of the abbot’s whole secret, which is a 
substitute for the two complementary monk halves of the whole secret with random life 
expiration times L2 and L3 respectively. Then the duration of the (L1, L2, L3) portfolio lasts 
as long as L1 has not leaked out or has been destroyed or independently discovered or not 
both L2 and L3 have leaked out or have been destroyed or independently discovered. Thus 
the portfolio life time or duration is dur (L1, L2, L3) := min(L1, max(L2, L3)) 
 
Suppose for the sake of illustration that L1, L2 and L3 are independently exponentially 
distributed with expected values 1/λ1, 1/λ2 and 1/λ3 and probability distribution functions 
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F1, F2, and F3. Then the distribution function for dur(L1, L2, L3) = 1- (1-F1)(1-F2∙F3)=: F. 
The expected duration of the portfolio is then = ∫ ݔ݀ܨ(ݔ)=:E(D) 
The expected evergreening effect of adding the portfolio of the secret halves of the monks 
to the abbot’s total secret is then 
 
E(D)- E(L1) = E(D)-1/λ1 
 
which is calculable once λ1, λ2 and λ3 are known. 
 
A more refined model (not shown here) takes the life expiration times of the secrecy 
holders, i e the individuals, into account as well, so that the repeated addition of new 
secrecy holders as described in the text leads to an embedded martingale and almost 
perfect evergreening under certain conditions (such as almost surely simultaneous deaths 
do not occur).  
One can note that a societal or community system for secrets in return for patents with a 
limited duration exceeding the expected duration of trade secret protection would represent 
a policy for (limited) evergreening.  
 
The reverse Benedictine case 
Suppose an IPR portfolio M consists of a product patent and two substitutable trade secrets 
for the production process and the life expiration times are L1, L2 and L3 respectively. Then 
the unweighted duration dur(M) = max(L1, min(L2, L3)) which formally is a kind of reverse 
situation to the Benedictine case. For independent L1, L2 and L3 with probability 
distributions F1, F2, and F3 the probability distribution function for dur(M) is: 
 
ܲݎ݋ܾ(݀ݑݎ(ܯ) ≤ ݐ) =  ܨଵ(ݐ)(1 − ൫1 − ܨଶ(ݐ)൯൫1 − ܨଷ(ݐ)൯) 
 
which can be used to calculate expected duration and evergreening effects e.g.  of adding 
the secrets to the patent.  
 
Optimal evergreening 
The economic effect from evergreening could be maximized by optimizing the timing of 
acquisition of additional IPRs. This is a complex optimization problem in general, which 
will be illustrated here in a very simplified case for analytical tractability. To that end, 
assume a patentable product invention is invented at time zero (i.e. a technical success 
occurs then in the R&D process) and a market launch of the corresponding new product is 
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planned for time M. The probability that the secret is uniquely kept at time t is assumed to 
drop linearly from one at t=0 to zero at t=M. A patent is applied for at time T ∈ [0,M] and 
is necessary (i e essential) and sufficient for the innovation during the patent life time of 20 
years. The patent gives a constant profit level during its effective protection time on the 
market as a patent premium V. Delaying patent application gives a longer market 
monopoly or market lead time, while speeding up patent application increases the 
probability to get the patent protection, so there is an optimization problem. It is then 
straightforward to show that the optimal T = min(0, M-10) and the value weighted duration 
of the patent durw = T + 20 - M for a zero discount rate (with a slightly more complicated 
expression for a constant non-zero discount rate). 
In concluding it may be noted that Losec was marketed close to 10 years after the 
application of the basic patent, that later turned out to be essential. The R&D and patenting 
people at Astra-Hässle at the time did not consider this optimization problem in full, 
however. They never accounted for the impact of an application delay upon the profit level 
towards the end of the product innovation life cycle (which could be as much as 200 
MUSD as described in the text), but only accounted for the risk that a competitor could 
win the patent race. At the same time they were unknowing about the essentiality of their 
patentable invention at the time of the application, a fact that was hardly knowable at the 
time but gradually became clear as the ensuing R&D unfolded. If the basic patent 
application could have been postponed, say 2 years, almost 5 BUSD in profits could have 
resulted (ceteris paribus), a kind of calculation that are remote from the ordinary calculus 
of R&D people. 
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